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I. INTRODUCTION
The major currents driving legal theory have largely bypassed the
field of criminal law. Neither the economists nor the advocates of critical legal studies ("crits") have had much to say about the theory of
criminal responsibility or the proper mode of trying suspects. The economists have fallen flat in applying their rationalist models to the
problems of punishing wrongdoers. 1 The "crits" have had little to
add-beyond Mark Kelman's one original and provocative article. 2
Of all the schools on the march in the law schools today, the feminists have had the most to say about the failings of the criminal law.
The critique of rape law burst on the intellectual scene with Susan
Brownmiller's best-selling book, Against Our Will: Men, Women, and
Rape.3 Susan Estrich made her career by opening up the field of rape
both to teaching and serious scholarship;' More recently, the field of
* Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University School of Law.
Editor's Note: Portions of this article, on pp. 571-75, have appeared previously in GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 133-34 & 141-47
(Copyright" 1995 by George P. Fletcher; reprinted with permission of Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc.) and, on pp. 556-61, in GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL 19-26 (Copyright c, 1988 by George P. Fletcher; reprinted
with permission of The Free Press, a division of Simon & Schuster).
1. For my criticisms of the economic thinking in criminal law, see George P. Fletcher, A
Transaction Theory of Crime?, 85 CoLUM. L. REV. 921 (1985).
2. Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 591 (1981).
3. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975).
4. See infra notes 6 and 7.
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self-defense has come under scrutiny as a body of law that, like rape,
traditionally discriminated against the rights of women. In this context,
we have heard much about the battered woman syndrome and how it
supposedly should apply to improve the position of desperate women
who kill their partners under borderline circumstances, such as the case
of the partner being asleep. These are situations that have always fallen
beyond the conventional bounds of self-defense. With sympathy for
battered women, however, commentators have taken a closer look at
the traditional contours of self-defense in an effort to make the doctrine
bend in their preferred direction. 15
This article addresses the debate about the proper structure of
claims of self-defense and, in particular, whether special rules should
apply on behalf of women who kill those who have persistently battered
them in the past. In this context, the feminist arguments accrue to the
benefit of (female?) criminal defendants. It is worth underscoring,
however, that the feminist critique of criminal law does not always
come out in favor of the accused. Witness the rape law reformers, who
broke away from the Warren Court's pattern of consistently favoring
the rights of the defendant. The interests of women in rape cases lie in
enabling the state to convict more easily. Thus Susan Estrich and
others have argued against the corroboration requirement to support
the testimony of witnesses complaining of rape. 6 Estrich also argued
against the ruling in the William Kennedy Smith case that three other
women who complained of sexual abuse by the defendant would not be
able to testify against him.7
The pro-prosecution slant of feminist influence has led to some
questionable legal decisions, such as the ruling in the Mike Tyson prosecution that three witnesses would not be permitted to testify that they
saw Desiree Washington necking with Mike Tyson a half hour before
5. For the more significant recent writing in the field, see Sharon Byrd, Till Death Do Us
Part: A Comparative Law Approach to Justifying Lethal Self-Defense by Battered Women, 1991
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 169; Anne Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1994);
Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 379, 391-97 (1991); Richard Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REV. 371 (1993); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert
Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195 (1986); Robert F. Schopp et al., Battered
Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the Distinction between Justification and Excuse,
1994 u. ILL. L. REV. 45.
6. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1137-39 (1986).
7. Susan Estrich, Palm Beach Stories, 11 J.L. & PHIL. 5, 12-13 (1992).
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the alleged rape. 8 My aim here is not to assess whether feminist influence has gone too far in strengthening the position of the prosecution,
but rather to assess the other side of the argument: the effort to expand
the rules of self-defense to make it easier to acquit women who kill
their husbands under circumstances. that would not ordinarily qualify
as self-defense. I shall assess these arguments, with a view particularly
to whether a history of domination between husband and wife (more
broadly, batterer and the person battered) should bear on the interpretation of self-defense. In conclusion, I shall explore the application of
the same in other contexts of alleged domination, particularly in the
notorious first trial of the Menendez brothers.
To keep a real case of wife battering in mind, think of the prosecution of Judy Norman in North Carolina. 9 John Norman had engaged
in systematic dehumanizing actions toward his wife Judy. Beginning
about five years after the wedding, he started drinking and, while
drunk, assaulting her, throwing glasses and bottles at her, putting out
cigarettes on her, breaking glass against her face and crushing food on
her face. In addition, he forced her to engage in prostitution to generate income for their household and mocked her streetwalking in front
of "family and friends."- If not satisfied with her earnings, he beat her
and called her "dog" and "whore." On a few occasions, he made her
eat pet food out of the pet's bowl and forced her to sleep on the floor.
Apparently, according to her testimony, he kept up these degrading
practices for about 20 years-until the day in mid-June 1985 when she
shot him in the back of the head.
There is ample corroboration of her story in the words of others.
For example, her daughter Phyllis testified that her father had beat her
mother "all day long" immediately prior to the shooting. Also, Judy
Norman had appealed with complaints to the police and to a domestic
abuse center at the local county hospital. The police would not intervene unless Judy took out a warrant for John's arrest, and that she
feared to do; she had experienced beatings in retaliation for prior efforts to leave the scene of her suffering. The situation went from bad to
worse. John was enraged and out of control, as a boarder testified, for
having been arrested on a drunk driving charge. At that point he forbad Judy from eating for three days prior to the shooting. The family
tried to get food to her, the mother sent over groceries, but Judy Nor8. For a critique of this ruling, see GEORGE
TIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 120-25 (1995).

P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VIC-

9. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
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man feared retaliation and a beating if she disobeyed her tyrannical
husband. The words that we have availed to describe these anti-human
conditions are too easily subject to abuse. This was a gulag she called
home.
If there was ever a clear relationship of dominance, this was it.
This is a case of obvious evil. And the legal system turned a blind eye.
The temptation is to think that the oppressed and battered woman
should take the law into her own hands. The victim of the shooting,
John Norman, had it coming to him. But however tragically Judy Norman's appeals to the authorities went unheeded, she cannot put herself
in the position of judge and executioner. If the authorities had responded and prosecuted John Norman, they could not-for all his
wickedness-impose the death penalty. There may be justice in his dying, but it is not a form of justice that the legal system can readily
accommodate.
One is reminded here of Joel Feinberg's useful distinction between
an action that is just and one that is justified. 10 John Norman's fate
may be just in some ultimate sense, but the legal system focuses solely
on whether Judy's killing him was justified as a matter of self-defense.
To be justified as self-defense, an action must fall under the rules governing the defense in the particular jurisdiction. In general terms, these
rules address five distinct issues:
I.

The Attack Must Be Immediate

Self-defense is about repelling attacks-or more broadly, about
fending off possible violations of rights. The first question, then, is when
the impending violation is sufficiently proximate to trigger a legitimate
response. The most common formula is that the attack must be imminent; it must be about to happen.
The requirement of imminence means that the time for defense is
now. The defender cannot wait any longer. This requirement distinguishes self-defense from the illegal use of force in two temporally related ways. A preemptive strike against a feared aggressor is illegal
force used too soon, and retaliation against a successful aggressor is
illegal force used too late. Legitimate self-defense must be neither too
soon nor too late.
In the case of a preemptive strike, the defender calculates that the
enemy is planning an attack or surely is likely to attack in the future,
10. See

JOEL FEINBERG. DOING AND DESERVING

(1970).
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and therefore it is wiser to strike first than to wait until the actual
aggression. Preemptive strikes are illegal in international law as they
are illegal internally in every legal system of the world. 11 They are illegal because they are not based on a visible manifestation of aggression;
they are grounded in a prediction of how the feared enemy is likely to
behave in the future.
The line between lawful self-defense and an unlawful preemptive
strike is not so easily staked out, but there are some clear instances of
both categories. Because the general principles of international law are
the same as those of domestic legal systems, we can ponder some dramatic examples among current international events.
Think about the various military moves that Israel has made
against Arab forces in the last twenty years. The strike against the
Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 was clearly preemptive, for the supposition that the Iraqis would use the reactor for military purposes was
based on an inference from private Israeli military intelligence. Even if
it is true that the Iraqis intended to manufacture a nuclear bomb, that
activity hardly constitutes an attack against Israel. Israel has its own
nuclear weapons, and its government would hotly contest the inference
that this fact alone establishes its intention to bomb Arab territory.
Preemptive strikes are always based on assumptions, more or less rational, that the enemy is likely to engage in hostile behavior. Israel
could well argue that it did not wish to take the chance that Iraq would
use nuclear weapons against the Jewish state as well as against Iran
and other opponents of the Baghdad regime. Be that as it may, there is
no doubt that the air attacks on the reactor constituted a preemptive
strike. The possible attack by Iraq was not sufficiently imminent to justify a response in self-defense.
More controversial is Israel's attack against Egypt in June 1967,
initiating the spectacular Israeli victory in the six-day war. Egypt
closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, amassed its troops on
Israel's border and secured command control over the armies of Jordan
and Iraq. In the two weeks preceding the Israeli response on June 5,
Nasser had repeatedly made bellicose threats, including the total destruction of Israel. The question is whether Egypt's threat was sufficiently imminent to justify Israel's response under international law.
Perhaps Egypt was merely bluffing; perhaps its leaders did not know
11. It seems that some writers use the term "preemptive strike" more broadly to refer to
defensive attacks prior to the actual initiation of hostilities by the aggressor. See MICHAEL
WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 80-85 (1977).
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whether they intended to attack or not. There is no doubt, however,
that Egypt was attempting to intimidate Israel by behaving as though
it were about to attack (unlike Iraq in the reactor incident). Israel took
the Egyptians at face value; it responded to what appeared to be an
attack in the offing. Could Israel have waited longer? Of course it
could have. But the requirement of imminence does not require that
guns actually fire, that bombs be in the air. And if anything short of
letting the missiles fly constitutes an imminent attack, then that requirement was fulfilled in the June 1967 conflict between Egypt and
Israel.
In cases of interpersonal as well as international violence, the outbreak might be neither defensive nor preemptive. It could be simply a
passionate retaliation for past wrongs suffered by the person resorting
to violence. Retaliatory acts seek to even the score-to inflict harm because harm has been suffered in the past.
Retaliation is the standard case of "taking the law into one's own
hands." There is no way, under the law, to justify killing a wife batterer or a rapist as retaliation or revenge, however much sympathy
there may be for the wife wreaking retaliation. Private citizens cannot
function as judge and jury toward each other. They have no authority
to pass judgment and to punish each other for past wrongs.
Those who defend the use of violence rarely admit that their purpose is retaliation for a past wrong. The argument typically is that the
actor feared a recurrence of the past violence, thus the focus shifts
from past to future violence, from retaliation to an argument of defending against an imminent attack. This is the standard maneuver in battered-wife cases. In view of her prior abuse, the wife arguably has reason to fear renewed violence. Killing the husband while he is asleep
then comes into focus as an arguably legitimate defensive response
rather than an illegitimate act of vengeance for past wrongs.
We shall return to this requirement, as it applies in the Norman
case, after surveying the other standard elements of self-defense.
2.

The Attack Must Be Unlawful or Unjustifiable

The general proposition is that self-defense is unavailable against
the lawful use of force. If the police are properly executing an arrest
warrant, defensive force is impermissible. The same is true of force
that is itself justified as self-defense. The principle is that if force is
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exercised as a matter of right, it would be self-contradictory to recognize a right to resist the exercise of the right. 12
The important corollary of this proposition is that if the attacker is
merely excused and not justified, then the attack is nonetheless contrary-to-right and in this sense unlawful. A defensive response is justified. It makes a difference, therefore, whether we classify insanity, duress, or mistake as claims of excuse or justification. Later, I will show
specifically why it is so important that self-defense based on a mistaken
perception of the facts be treated as excused rather than justified.

3. The Level of Force Must Be Necessary
If we assume, in the Norman case, that the requirement of an imminent attack is satisfied, the question remains whether the other elements of justifiable self-defense are present in the shooting. Judy's
shooting her husband in the back of the head must have been necessary
under the circumstances. Was there a less drastic effective response?
This inquiry calls for a counterfactual conditional response. One has to
imagine what would have happened had Judy just wounded her husband in the leg. In view of his threats against her in the past, this
might have been a dangerous option. But in every case, using lesser
force incurs risks. The question is always whether it is fair to impose
these risks on the person attacked. Our sympathy for the plight of the
particular victim of attack undoubtedly influences our sentiments about
the imprecise question whether using lesser force was mandated under
the circumstances.

4.

The Response Must Be Proportional to the Harm Threatened

The requirement of proportionality adds a problem beyond the necessity of the defensive response. To understand the distinction between
proportionality and necessity, think about the ratio between the means
of resistance and the gravity of the attack. Necessity speaks to the
question whether some less costly means of defense, such as merely
showing the gun or firing a warning shot into the air, might be sufficient to ward off an attack. The requirement of proportionality addresses the ratio of harms emanating from both the attack and the defense. The harm done in disabling the aggressor must not be excessive
12. For an analysis of the extent to which this principle is recognized in American law, see
George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REv. 949 (1985).
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or disproportionate relative to the harm threatened and likely to result
from the attack.
Some examples will illuminate the distinction. Suppose that a liquor store owner has no means of preventing a thief from escaping with
a few bottles of scotch except to shoot him. Most people would recoil
from the notion that protecting property justifies shooting and risking
the death of escaping thieves. It is better from a social point of view to
suffer the theft of a few bottles of liquor than to inflict serious physical
harm on a fellow human being.
It is not simply that property rights must sometimes give way to
our concern for the lives and well-being, even of aggressors. Suppose
that the only way for a woman to avoid being touched by a man
harassing her is to respond with deadly force-by, say, cutting him
with a razor blade. May she engage in this act necessary for her defense rather than suffer the personal indignity of being touched? Most
people would probably say that a little unwanted touching is not nearly
as bad as being cut or stabbed in response. Of course, if she were
threatened with rape, she could use every necessary means at her disposal to protect herself. No legal system in the Western world would expect a woman to endure a rape if her only means of defense required
that she risk the death of her aggressor.
Proportionality in self-defense requires a balancing of competing
interests, the interests of the defender and those of the aggressor. As
the innocent party in the fray, a woman defending against rape has
interests that weigh more than those of the aggressor. She may kill to
ward off a threat to her sexual autonomy, but she has no license to take
life in order to avoid every petty interference with her autonomy. If the
only way she can avoid being touched is to kill, that response seems
clearly to be excessive relative to the interests at stake. In the Norman
case, however, the threat to the wife was sufficiently great to warrant a
deadly response. If Judy Norman's response was necessary, it was presumably also proportional to the harm she faced.
Even if we have two thumbs on the scale in favor of the defender,
however, there comes a point at which the aggressor's basic human interests will outweigh those of an innocent victim, thumbs and all. There
is obviously no way to determine the breaking point, even theoretically.
At a certain point our sensibilities are triggered, our compassion for the
human being behind the mask of the evil aggressor is engaged, and we
have to say "Stop! That's enough."

1996]
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The Intent of the Defender Must Be to Deflect the Attack

Three of the preceding characteristics of self-defense-imminence,
necessity and proportionality-speak to the objective characteristics of
the attack and the defense in response. In order to establish that these
requirements are satisfied, we need not ask any questions about what
the defender herself actually knows about the circumstances of the attack and the defense. The relevant questions are purely objective.
The consensus of Western legal systems is that in order to invoke a
sound claim of self-defense, the defender must know about the attack
and act with the intention of repelling it. Surprisingly, some leading
scholars think that in a case of criminal homicide, the accused should
be able to invoke self-defense even if he does not know about the attack.13 Their argument is that if you cannot be guilty of homicide by
killing someone who is already dead (no matter what your intent) you
should not be guilty of homicide by killing an aggressor (no matter
what your intent). No harm, no crime. And there is arguably no harm
in killing an aggressor.
Yet there is an important moral difference between pumping lead
into a dead body and killing an aggressor in self-defense. We can comfortably say that there is no harm in the former case (except perhaps
interference with a dead body), but injuring or killing a human being
remains a harm, even if the harm is inflicted in self-defense. Justifying
the infliction of harm against a human being acknowledges the harm
but asserts that it was inflicted for good reason. The good reason is one
that the defendant must personally entertain. It must be his or her reason for inflicting the harm. 14
Note that the intention required is not to make the aggressor suffer but merely to thwart the attack, to ward it off, to prevent it from
happening. Working out this distinction-between making the aggressor suffer and fending off an attack-was a critical advance in the
Western understanding of self-defense. So far as I know, Thomas
13. See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 504 (2d ed. 1983) ("The law
would be oppressive if it said: It is true that you took this action because you felt it in your bones
that you were in peril, and it is true that you were right, but you cannot now assign reasonable
grounds for your belief, so you were only right by a fluke and will be convicted."); 2 PAUL H.
ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES§ 122 (1984).
14. Russell Christopher has developed a more sophisticated argument for the intent requirement. He claims, convincingly, that not requiring intent would lead to an irreconcilable contradiction in conjunction with the rule permitting defensive force only against unlawful, unjustified attacks. See Russell Christopher, Unknowing Justification and the Logical Necessity of the Dadson
Principle in Self-Defence, IS OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 229 (1995).
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Aquinas was the first to note the distinction and to limit self-defense to
an intention designed to repel the attack. 111 Without this distinction, it
is tempting to think of self-defense as a form of private punishment,
designed to make the aggressor suffer for the attack.
Yet the distinction between punishment and self-defense is fundamental. Without a clear understanding of the conceptual distinction between the two, we would find it hard to explain why it is possible to use
deadly force even in those cases where capital punishment would be out
of the question. For example, deadly force is permissible to defend
against rape, but capital punishment for rape would be unconstitutional. When a nation abolishes capital punishment, as have most European countries, it does not thereby modify its law of self-defense. Also,
self-defense is permissible against unjustified, but excused, aggression.
This would not be conceptually tenable if defensive force were considered an act of punishment. The excused aggressor is never punished for
his deed, but he may suffer serious physical consequences when his aggression is justifiably thwarted.
These five elements of self-defense -imminence, unlawfulness, necessity, proportionality, and intention-interweave in the standard legislative definitions of legitimate defensive force. Consider the Model
Penal Code: "[Subject to certain limitations] the use of force upon or
toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such
force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself
against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present
occasion. " 16
The requirement of imminence is reflected in the language "immediately necessary ... on the present occasion." The element of "unlawfulness" is made explicit; the principle that excused attacks are unlawful is recognized in § 3.11, which explicitly limits the scope of
§ 3.04. The phrase "immediately necessary" also captures the necessity of the response. The element of proportionality is made explicit in
§ 3.04(2)(b), which limits the use of deadly force to cases of
threatened homicide, serious bodily harm, kidnapping, or rape. The required intention to defend oneself comes through in the pivotal position
occupied by the word "believes" in the drafting of the section.
The word "believes" is so centrally located in § 3.04(1) that it
appears that what is at stake is not an actual unlawful attack, but
IS. See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA TuEOLOGIAE pt. II-II, q. 64, a.7.
16. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1962).
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merely the belief of the actor that an attack is under way. This mode of
drafting captures what is in fact a deep misunderstanding about selfdefense in American jurisprudence. The requirement of intention -number five in the list above- has become the necessary and sufficient condition for justifiable self-defense.
According to a strict reading of§ 3.04, if the actor "believes that
such force is immediately necessary ... on the present occasion," then
it is justifiable not only in his mind, but in fact. In order words, all that
is required is the right intention. The correct mental state justifies the
infliction of harm on an innocent bystander.
This is the approach to self-defense reflected in a jury instruction
litigated in the 1977 Washington case, State v. Wanrow, now a leading
precedent supporting expanded self-defense on behalf of battered
women:
To justify killing in self-defense, there need be no actual or real danger to the
life or person of the party killing, but there must be, or reasonably appear to be,
at or immediately before the killing, some overt act, or some circumstances
which would reasonably indicate to the party killing that the person slain, is, at
the time, endeavoring to kill him or inflict upon him great bodily harm.17

This, it is fair to say, is the standard "subjectivist" view of selfdefense in the United States. The defense comes into being on the basis
of the reasonable belief of the defender. The requirement of reasonable
belief is also implicit in the structure of the Model Penal Code: a later
provision, § 3.09, makes its clear that § 3.04 is limited to beliefs that
are nonnegligent and reasonable.
Note the subtle transformation that has occurred in the theory of
self-defense. The intent requirement becomes a standard of belief,
which in turn becomes the mirror for all the objective requirements of
imminent and unlawful attack and the necessity and proportionality of
the response. In the end, all that counts is the belief, albeit reasonable
belief, that these objective facts obtain in the real world.

II. Two

PROPOSITIONS ABOUT JUSTIFICATION

Having surveyed this background material about self-defense as it
is understood in American law, I wish to assert two propositions that I
will defend as the relatively original contribution of this paper.
The first claim is that beliefs alone cannot justify the infliction of
17. State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 555 n.7 (Wash. 1977) (quoting Jury Instruction No.
10).
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violence on another human being. Reasonable beliefs can excuse
wrongful aggression against another person but they cannot justify that
aggression. Some interaction in the real world is required for a claim of
justified harm. The factor of reasonable belief bears properly not on
justification but on the excuse of reasonable mistake in using defensive
force.
The second claim is that past relationships of dominance cannot
and should not affect the analysis of justification. The proper bearing of
past relationships of power and dominance bear, at most, on the reasonableness of the mistaken belief in the necessity of defensive force.
At first blush it is difficult to understand how anyone would argue
that beliefs alone could possibly justify harming an innocent person.
But there are two arguments that seem to come forward from time to
time to uphold the position of American law. One is a misinterpretation
of Kantian moral theory that goes something like this. Kant writes in
the first sentence of his leading work on ethical theory, Foundations of
the Metaphysics of Morals: "Nothing in the world can possibly be conceived ... which can be called good without qualification except a
good will." 18 The common mistake is to read the reference to the
"good will" as synonymous with a good intention and therefore to believe that Kant upholds a view of the following sort: If one's intentions
are proper, one's action is proper. This view is a little more than a
tendentious and clever misreading of Kant, whose conception of the
will has nothing to do with intentions. Yet once this misreading is negotiated, the rest follows easily: The move from intentions to beliefs is not
a great leap, and therefore it follows that believing in the necessity of
self-defense seems, erroneously, to be a proper basis for concluding that
defensive force is morally proper. And if it is morally proper, it presumably is also justified. There are at least a half dozen errors in this
common line of argument. But somehow the argument hangs together
well enough to convince a lot of writers.
The big factor missing from the above line of argument is why the
belief must be reasonable. If any proper belief can find its warrant for
justification in the first sentence of Kant's Foundations, then there is
no reason to insist that the belief be not only in good faith but reasonable as well.
If, in contrast, the issue of belief bears solely on an asserted excuse
18. IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Lewis
trans. & Robert P. Wolff ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1969) (1785).

w.

Beck
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of mistake, then the requirement of reasonableness does make sense.
Excuses negate culpability or blameworthiness, and therefore a good
excuse is one that is free from blame. Only reasonable mistakes have
this quality of being free from blame and therefore adequate to negate
the defender's culpability for unjustifiably injuring the putative
aggressor.
The second argument squarely addresses the requirement of reasonable perception of the conditions for a justification and finds in the
matrix of reasonableness the conditions for justifying the action. The
best exposition of this argument comes in an article by Kent Greenawalt, in which he poses a case of necessity as a justification: forest
ranger Roger intentionally destroys property in order to prevent the
spread of a forest fire. 19 The decision to blast a fire break in one place
rather than another depends on the actor's predicting the way the fire
is going to spread, and that in turn depends on his assessment of wind
movements. "Employing the most advanced techniques" 20 for making
this judgment, Roger thinks that the wind is going to blow one way and
in turn it blows the other way. His destroying the property is for
nought. And yet Greenawalt thinks that, though this conduct turned
out to be wasteful, it was reasonable and therefore justified at the time
of decision.
Greenawalt has no qualms about saying "the risk Roger took was
justified" and infers that his action was therefore warranted and justified. 21 Now the focus of the justification is no longer the action, but the
risk Roger decides to run. In deciding to destroy property in one place
rather than another, Roger acts against a backdrop of a world perceived according to "the most advanced techniques for predicting wind
patterns."22 The world of risk, as he understands it, is the world in
which he acts. The implicit assumption of Greenawalt's analysis is that
Roger is not mistaken at all. He competently and reasonably understands the risk and though there is later an "unfortunate outcome," he
acts correctly under the circumstances. Given this way of thinking
about risk and reality, Greenawalt's conclusion follows that the conduct
is justified.
Greenawalt picks an easy case to lay the groundwork for the argu19. Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84
REV. 1897, 1908 (1984).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1908-09.
22. Id. at 1908.
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ment that a reasonable choice based on a reasonable perception of reality justifies the resulting action and consequences. The next step is to
extend the argument to a situation in which there is a fact of the matter knowable at the time of the action. This he does in contemplating
the fact pattern in the Young case in New York. 23 The defendant came
upon a street fight in which a youth was struggling with two middleaged men. Reasonably concluding that the young man was the victim,
he intervened on his behalf. It turned out, however, that the two middle-aged men whom he assaulted were police officers engaged in properly effectuating an arrest. The New York court convicted Young of
assaulting the officers. 24 This seems clearly unjust because, as Greenawalt concludes, "Young is to be praised, not blamed, for what he did,
and members of society would wish that others faced with similar situations requiring instant judgment would act as Young did." 26 It is good
for people to intervene in fights to protect the person they reasonably
perceive to be the victim.
It is clear that in view of his reasonable mistake, Young should not
have been convicted. The linchpin of Greenawalt's argument, however,
is the move from not-blaming to praising. Given the world as it appeared to Young, what he did was right. Even if the result was unfortunate, the action on the basis of appearance was correct. It was the kind
of decision we would want others to emulate. 26
Two factors intersect in Greenawalt's defense of treating reasonable mistakes about justifying conditions as themselves claims of justification. The first is the shift from reality to appearances, from the fact
of the matter to the contingent world of risk. The second is the judgment that the decision on the basis of appearances is worthy of emulation. When these two factors converge, the case is strongest that the
defense should be classified as a justification based on the world as we
rationally perceive it. It follows that if it appears reasonable to me that
I am about to be attacked, I am justified in responding with defensive
force, even deadly force.
Greenawalt's strategy converts mistakes about harmful actions
into justifiable judgments about perceived reality. Yet the distinction
23. People v. Young, 183 N.E.2d 319 (N.Y. 1962).
24. Id. at 319-20.
25. Greenawalt, supra note 19, at 1919.
26. On the relationship between emulable behavior and the theory of excuses, see Claire
Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the Defense in Law, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 251
(1995).
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between a reasonable and therefore justifiable judgment and a harmful
but justified action is worth maintaining. Reasonable mistakes in selfdefense cases are about actions that are harmful to innocent people-unjustifiable, unlawful actions that can, at the most, be excused
on grounds of mistake.

III.

DOMINATION AND IMMINENCE

The central debate in the theory of self-defense for the last decade
has been whether we should maintain a strict requirement of imminence in assessing which attacks trigger a legitimate defensive response. The traditional rule confronts a critique favoring relaxation of
the rule primarily to make it easier for battered women to assert a
claim of self-defense in cases of doubtful imminence. The typical case
in dispute is like the Norman case-one in which the battered woman
kills her batterer when he is asleep or otherwise quiescent. In her trial
for the 1985 killing, Judy Norman was held to the strict imminence
requirement and, as might be expected, her claim of self-defense failed.
She was convicted of manslaughter, sentenced to six years in prison but
released three months into her term after the governor commuted her
sentence.27
To many critics it seems that Judy Norman had no practicable,
reasonable choice. Her shooting her husband in the head was a necessary response under the circumstances. Thus, the argument goes, there
must be something wrong with the imminence requirement. The critique of the imminence requirement is buttressed by additional
considerations:
1. The shift in language in the Model Penal Code from imminence
to "immediately necessary."
2. Hypothetical cases involving long range latent dangers that
make killing necessary even though the attack does not seem to be
imminent. 28
27. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 11, 13, 16 (N.C. 1989).
28. Consider this hypothetical case presented in Schopp et al., supra note 5, at 66-67:
[T]he hikers X and Y ••• engage in a ten-day race across the desert. The only source of
water in the desert is a single water hole approximately half way to the finish line. Each
hiker must carry a five to six day supply of water and replenish the supply at the water
hole in order to survive the race. During the first few days, X catches Y attempting to
sabotage X by changing trail markers and attempting to steal X's compass and water. If
successful, each of these efforts would have caused X to die in the desert.
As day five begins, both hikers are almost out of water and must replenish their supplies the next day at the water hole. As Y passes X on the trail on the morning of the fifth
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3. The subjectivist interpretation of self-defense that seems to
make the interpretation of imminence dependent on the perceptions of
the defender. 29
A number of these objections would be satisfied by recognizing an
excuse of self-defense based on necessary action where there is no practicable alternative. Under this standard, Judy Norman would have
been excused and acquitted.
The more difficult questions arise in the context of justification.
Does the imminence requirement belong in a properly constructed standard of justifiable self-defense? And if it does, is it proper to condition
the interpretation of imminence on the power relationship between the
parties? Does it follow that the battered wife, subject to the domination
of her husband, should be allowed a broader interpretation of
imminence?
In response to these questions, I confess that the existing literature
of criminal law has done a woefully inadequate job in constructing a
case for the imminence requirement. The traditional rule, arguably
based on patriarchy, hardly persuades feminist critics. Needed is an
argument of principle about why only imminent attacks-those about
to happen-should trigger a right of self-defense.
Explaining the imminence requirement confronts the initial difficulty of overcoming the subjectivist bias in current thinking about selfdefense. 30 Generating a defense for a strict imminence requirement differs from an account of why the defender must believe, in the words of
the Model Penal Code, that the use of force is "immediately necessary"
to defend himself or another "on the present occasion." 31 So far, accounts of both the objective and subjective view remain wanting.
To gain some perspective on the problem, think of the analogous
requirement in cases of necessity. In this context, the tendency of the
day, Y holds up a box of rat poison and says to X, "I'll get you this time; I'll beat you to
the water hole, get my water, and poison the rest; You'll never get out of here alive." Both
hikers walk all day, but due to a sprained ankle, X can barely keep up with Y. That
evening, as X is forced to stop due to the sprained ankle and exhaustion, Y says "I'll walk
all night and get to the water hole before morning." As Y begins to walk away, X, who is
unable to continue that night, says "wait," but Y walks in the direction of the water hole.
X shoots Y, convinced by Y's prior threats and sabotage that this is the only way to prevent Y from poisoning the water hole the next morning.
29. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
30. For an original defense of the subjectivist bias, see Russell L. Christopher, Mistake of

Fact in the Objective Theory of Justification: Do Two Rights Make Two Wrongs Make Two
Rights .. .?, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295 (1994).
31.

MODEL PENAL CODE §

3.04(1) (1962).
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courts is to insist on an actual situation of necessity-an actual emergency-to justify a departure from a criminal norm. There must be an
actual danger to the public or private individuals before demonstrators
can even hope to justify trespassing, violating a police order, or damaging property. The rationale for the defense is that the individual violates a nominal prohibition for the sake of a greater social good. 82
The Model Penal Code, which has had an enormous influence in
generating acceptance of the necessity defense, fails to mention an imminence requirement under § 3.02. Unless a contrary legislative intent
appears, every criminal prohibition is subject to being overridden by
the private judgments of individuals. Yet in the defense as adopted by
several states, the requirement of imminent danger has sensibly reasserted itself.88
In the context of necessity, the standard of imminence provides a
solution to the problem of limiting the competence of individuals to
override legislative judgment about the social welfare. Limiting the
privilege of necessity to cases of imminent risk means that the individual cannot pick the time, the place, or the victim of his judgment about
what the law requires him to do. If an accident victim lies bleeding on
the sidewalk and it is necessary to take someone's car to get him to the
hospital, the range of car owners who might suffer the intrusion is limited. The situation of imminent risk prescribes the parameters under
which an individual can assert his view of rightful conduct.
The limited range of competence to invoke the necessity defense
stands in contrast to the free-ranging legislative power to prescribe general rules of socially desirable conduct. Every socially justified prohibition benefits some people and harms others, yet it is the legislature's
prerogative to make these judgments that impose uncompensated costs
on some people. The legislature is empowered, in short, to pick the victims of the common good. Yet these are not the costs that we wish
private individuals to impose on each other, even if the private judgment of social welfare is correct. Thus the requirement of imminent
32. At least this objective requirement was assumed, without much argument, in the trial of
Bernhard Goetz. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND
nm LAW ON TRIAL 39-62 (1988).
33. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 463 (1987) ("to avoid an imminent . . . injury which is
about to occur"); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1-702 (1986) (same language as Delaware); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 503.030 (Baldwin 1995) ("imminent . . . injury"); see also United States v.
Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697, 701 (8th Cir. 1972) (necessity available to justify the stealing of draft
cards during the Vietnam War only if the action was undertaken to avoid a "direct and immediate
peril").
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risk insures that the stage be set before the individual play his part in
furthering the common good.
The significance of the imminence requirement in cases of selfdefense bears some resemblance to the account I have given of imminence in necessity cases. In the latter context, the imminence requirement expresses the limits of governmental competence: when the danger to a protected interest is imminent and unavoidable, the legislature
can no longer make reliable judgments about which of the conflicting
interests should prevail. Similarly, when an attack against private individuals is imminent, the police are no longer in a position to intervene
and exercise the state's function of securing public safety. The individual right to self-defense kicks in precisely because immediate action is
necessary. Individuals do not cede a total monopoly of force to the
state. They reserve the right when danger is imminent and otherwise
unavoidable to secure their own safety against aggression.
Several implications follow from this account of the imminence requirement. First, the requirement properly falls into the domain of political rather than moral theory. The issue is the proper allocation of
authority between the state and the citizen. When the requirement is
not met, when individuals engage in preemptive attacks against suspected future aggressors, we fault them on political grounds. They exceed their authority as citizens; they take "the law into their own
hands." Precisely because the issue is political rather than moral, the
requirement must be both objective and public. There must be a signal
to the community that this is an incident in which the law ceases to
protect, that the individual must secure his or her own safety.
Now so far as the issue is objective, the interpretation of attacks as
imminent depends exclusively on the qualities of the attack-on its
proximity to success and on the danger latent in the threatened use of
force. The background relationships of the parties, whether one is dominant and the other subordinate, should not matter. This seems to be
obvious in relations between states. Whether Egypt is engaged in an
imminent attack against Israel depends exclusively on what they are
doing. The general power relationship between the parties might have
some bearing on the interpretation of the danger expressed by amassing
troops at the border. But whether one state does the bidding of the
other should not give the subordinate party either an advantage or disadvantage. If this proposition applies as between Israel and Egypt, it
should also govern the relations between Judy Norman and her battering husband.
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nesses became the emblem of the current fascination with relationships
of abuse.
The plan to beat murder charges was this. The boys would testify
that each was subject to years of sexual abuse by both father and
mother, that immediately prior to the killings Kitty pulled Lyle's toupee off his head and this event supposedly generated sympathy in Erik,
the younger brother, for Lyle's embarrassment. Erik then confessed to
Lyle that his father had sodomized him for the last twelve years; this
prompted Lyle to go to his father and insist that the abuse cease or he
would make it public. Jose supposedly responded with a threat to kill
the two boys. A defense of self-defense began to come into relief.
The problem that Erik and Lyle faced was the same as the typical
problem in the battered wife cases. On the day they were killed, the
parents did nothing to indicate a threat to their sons. They were sitting
at home, watching television. They were no more overtly aggressive
than the sleeping husbands in cases like Judy Norman's. How could the
brothers overcome this obvious impediment? The basic rule in California was the same as in North Carolina. Erik and Lyle could claim selfdefense only if they were in "reasonable fear of imminent death or
great bodily harm." 35 And surely this was not the case.
Yet California recognizes a doctrine called "imperfect self-defense" that permits a defendant to rely on self-defense even if his fear
is unreasonable. This defense derives its force from the assumption that
if a killer fears an attack, however unreasonably, he does not act with
the malice aforethought necessary for murder. The doctrine makes
some sense: if a persons kills in self-defense, then he acts, more or less,
in good faith, and good faith is incompatible with hatred or malice toward the victim. 36 North Carolina recognizes this principle too, but it
could not help Judy Norman on appeal. Even if the jury finds that this
fear-based good faith prompted the killing, they should convict of manslaughter, and Judy had been convicted only for manslaughter.
Going into the Menendez trial, public outrage strongly backed the
Los Angeles District Attorney who was committed to seeking the maximum conviction and punishment, including the gas chamber for the
35. California Jury Instructions, Criminal No. 5.12 (Arnold Levin ed., 5th ed. 1988) [hereinafter CALJIC].
36. The guiding jury instruction, id. at No. 5.17, reads as follows: "A person, who kills
another person in the honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend against imminent
peril to life or great bodily injury, kills unlawfully, but does not harbor malice aforethought and is
not guilty of murder."
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In cases like Norman, however, an additional element seems to
influence those who seek to relax the law in favor of the battered wife
who strikes back. The political issue at stake in interpreting the requirement of imminence is whether the state's authority to keep the
peace should yield to the individual's authority to use force in self-protection. The argument is often made that in these cases, the state fails
to exercise its protective function. Judy Norman in fact sought protection from social agencies and she failed to receive it. 84 In other cases,
the police fail to intervene to protect those who are victimized at home.
In these situations, where there is a gap between the theory of state
protection and the reality of police indifference, it becomes difficult to
assess whether the courts of the state should be required to recognize a
broader than usual right of self-defense. The problem, it seems, is to
formulate a precise test of how badly the police have failed and to determine a proportionate adjustment in the law of self-defense.
This is about as good a case as I can make for the view that the
underlying relationship of dominance and subordination should not
bear on the analysis of self-defense as a justification. The deeper point
that I have established, I hope, is that because the requirement of imminence is political rather than moral, the element of self-defense
known as an "imminent attack" must actually occur in the real world.
The attack signals to the community that the defensive response is not
a form of aggression but a legitimate response in the name of selfprotection. Self-defense becomes compatible with the state's supposed
monopoly over the use of force precisely because the community can
understand the exceptional nature of self-defense in response to imminent attacks.
IV.

LESSONS FROM THE MENENDEZ CASE

The political analysis of imminence as a public event helps us to
understand where the trial court went wrong in the notorious first trial
of the Menendez brothers. At first it did not seem as though there
would be much controversy about the guilt of Lyle and Erik Menendez,
who in the summer of 1989, at the ages of 21 and 18, entered their own
home with shotguns just purchased in San Diego and emptied fifteen
rounds into their father and mother, Jose and Kitty Menendez. Yet as
the trial unfolded, the televised parade of surprising and shocking wit34. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 10 (N.C. 1989).
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cold-blooded murder of the two people to whom, if morality means
anything, the Menendez boys owed a duty of respect. Yet when Lyle
and Erik began testifying about their sexual abuses at the hands of
their father and the participation by their mother, the public began to
sway to their side. Lyle gave such a good performance that as he
stepped down from the stand several jurors were in tears. The appetite
for the details only increased as Erik testified and defense lawyer Leslie
Abramson tried to create the impression that some hard evidence corroborated their testimony. In fact virtually no evidence, except an ambiguous photograph of the defendants as nude children, supported their
tales of abuse. And there was compelling silent evidence on the other
side. They both complained of forced sodomy; yet there was no signs of
bruising or tissue damage to their anuses. When they confessed their
crime to their psychiatrist Jerome Oziel, they failed to mention their
fear of a preemptive attack. No members of the family had witnessed
any parental behavior that could qualify as physical or psychological
abuse. In the end, the defense's case turned almost entirely on the persuasive but self-interested performance that Lyle and Erik gave on the
stand.
Yet there were portions of the public and of the jury who were
eager to believe. An abusive parent is an enemy-much more of an
enemy, apparently, than a child who puts a shotgun to his mother's
face and blasts away. The case for the defense degenerated rather
quickly into an attempt to convict the parents. This was the real strategy from the outset. As Leslie Abramson said as the defendant's testimony began to make its impact: "If people would just think for a minute, there are some fundamental precepts of family life. Precept No. 1
is that children love their parents. Good parents do not get shotgunned
by their kids. Period."37 The nub of the defense, therefore, was that the
parents must have done something to deserve their fate. This is the
classic strategy of blaming the victim.
The most disturbing aspect of the transformation of the case into a
trial of the parents for abuse is that journalists took this testimony of
abuse seriously and accepted the wildcat defense theory that prior
abuse somehow made the killing all right. As the distinguished New
York Times reporter Seth Mydans formulated the "core question" of
the trial, it was: "to what degree a history of child molestation can
37. Elizabeth Gleick, Blood Brothers,

PEOPLE,

Sept. 27, 1993, at 32.
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justify parricide." 88 This is a truly remarkable perversion of the trial
and its doctrines. First, the formulation of the question presupposes
that there was "a history of child molestation." At a certain point in
their coverage, the mainstream press simply lost its critical judgment
and assumed that where there was testimony, there must be facts. Even
if we assume that there was a "history of child molestation," the suggestion that this history could justify the killings would come as a great
surprise to Judge Stanley Weisberg. The most that could be said under
the judge's instructions to the jury was that a fear of "imminent death
or great bodily harm" would negate the malice required for murder.
There was no reference in the judge's rulings to the possibility of justifying the double parricide.
On the legal questions as they were actually formulated by the
judge, two juries-one for Lyle and one for Erik-could not make up
their minds. After an average of three weeks of stormy deliberations
(nineteen days for Erik, twenty-five for Lyle), the representatives of the
people remained divided, roughly half voting for murder and the other
half for manslaughter. Erik's jury split right on the gender line. Six
women accepted the story of abuse and voted from the outset for the
less severe verdict. The men remained skeptical until the end. Five held
out for first-degree murder, and one was willing to compromise on second-degree murder.
It is not clear why the women were so easily persuaded. One would
expect that they would have identified with the defenseless Kitty. The
most likely supposition is that the cry of abuse resonates so strongly
with women that two female defense lawyers, Abramson and Jill Lansing, could persuade them that this was another instance of the phenomenon that has plagued women as victims of rape and domestic battering. Yet associating the alleged abuse of Lyle and Erik with the
condition of women who demonstrably suffered, as did Judy Norman,
illustrates the tendency of good ideas to find their cheapest common
denominator. Judy Norman could not escape without fearing being
caught and beaten, as she had been beaten in the past. Nothing
stopped the monied Menendez boys from getting in their Alfa Romeo,
a recent present from their allegedly abusive father, and driving their
way to freedom. If they motored their way to San Diego to buy a shotgun, they could find their way out of their silver-lined unhappiness.
38. Seth Mydans, The Other Menendez Trial, Too, Ends with the Jury Deadlocked, N.Y.
Jan. 29, 1994, at Al.
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Judge Stanley Weisberg made a tragic mistake in admitting the
evidence of abuse in the first place. The legal point that governed his
decision was exactly the same as in the Norman case. To claim a relevant fear of "imminent death or great bodily harm," the threatened
attack must indeed be imminent. It must be about to happen -in an
objective sense visible to any observer. If Judge Weisberg had understood imminence to be an objective precondition for the argument of
"imperfect self-defense," he could have ruled uncontroversially that the
feared attack was simply not imminent. There was no evidence of a
planned attack against the boys that evening or even that week. And if
the attack was not objectively imminent, the defendants' supposed fear
was irrelevant to the charge of first-degree murder. And if their fear
was irrelevant, so was the evidence of supposed abuse. The judge
should have ruled all of it inadmissible. 39
Yet the subjectivist tendencies of American legal thought exercise
an enormous attraction. The dissent in Norman succumbed to the same
argument: "In the context of the doctrine of self-defense, the definition
of 'imminent' must be informed by the defendant's perceptions."40 In
other words, if the defendants believed that the attack was imminent,
they could escape liability for first-degree murder. It is not clear
whether the jury even cared about whether Lyle and Erik believed the
attack was imminent or not. So long as the defendants could devise an
argument for treating the evidence of abuse as relevant (it supposedly
explained their fear of attack) they could testify about their "history of
child molestation," put their victim-parents on trial, and thus secure a
balancing of their wrong against their parents' wrong. We should never
forget the Menendez trial, for it illustrates the great myth that juries
and the public care about legal questions as they are formulated in jury
instructions. No matter how precisely the judge defined the issue of
imperfect self-defense, the press and their readers would view the dispute as a question whether "a history of child molestation can justify
parricide."
The Menendez debacle leaves two messages for us to ponder.
First, there is no way to limit arguments of domination and abuse to
39. Nothing in the language of the jury instructions, supra note 36, suggests the defendants'
perceptions should be controlling on the question of imminence. The leading case is People v.
Flannel, 603 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979). This opinion is also ambiguous on the same question. Judge
Weisberg ruled for purposes of the second trial that the evidence of child abuse was inadmissible.
See Alan Abrahamson, Judge Moves to Block Menendez Abuse Experts, LA TIMES, Apr. 18,
1995, at Al.
40. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 18 (1989) (Martin, J., dissenting).
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the justification of force in situations of ongoing domestic violence between men and women (or between adult gay couples). Some feminists
may have thought that advancing the battered woman's claims of selfdefense would help women as a special class that deserved special protection after centuries of discrimination. The battered woman syndrome would represent something like affirmative action in the courts;
it would compensate for all the prejudice that had accumulated against
women, particularly in rape cases. But if there is any principle guiding
legal thought, it is the egalitarian impulse toward generalization by
analogy. The courts cannot recognize a defense for the blue eyed and
refuse it to the brown eyed. There is no way of limiting a new defense
to a privileged class. If the "syndrome" relaxes the criteria of self-defense for women, it must have the same impact for battered men and
battered children. This was obvious to Leslie Abramson, Erik's lawyer,
who made it clear from the outset that the defense would develop a
defense for battered children that would draw on the innovations developed for battered women.
The second message of the Menendez trial is that if relationships
of dominance are introduced in the context of self-defense and other
claims of justification, the tendency of well-meaning observers will be
to repeat the Mydans mistake: Treating the issue as an exploration of
whether a history of abuse and domination justifies retaliatory action
by the subordinated party. In self-defense cases, as they are now tried,
this temptation is ever present.41 There is no reason to confuse the law
even further by inviting arguments about whether a history of domination could justify striking back by the victimized person.
V.

DOMINATION AS IT BEARS ON EXCUSES

The question remains: How should the law bring relief to people
like Judy Norman? There must be a way to accomplish this end without triggering the kind of distortions represented by the Menendez
trial. My view, which I have expressed many times, is that the law
should make greater use of excusing conditions. The prior relationship
between the parties should bear on aspects of self-defense that sound in
the theory of excuses, namely the recognition that the action is wrongful but nonetheless not a fit basis for blaming and punishing the person
who resorts to violence.
41. See the way the argument that self-defense is punishment functioned in the Goetz case.
supra note 32, at 27-29.
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Two features of self-defense properly appeal to criteria that negate
the blameworthiness of the defender. One is the theory of necessity.
Where there is no reasonable choice but to attack someone who is
sleeping or otherwise in a quiescent mode, the proper argument is not
that the attack is right and lawful, but that the actor is not properly
subject to blame for acting on the instinct of self-preservation. A prior
relationship of dominance bears upon the analysis of necessity, for it
assists us in und~rstanding whether reasonable alternatives permitted
an escape from the situation without resorting to the use of deadly
force.
Relations of dominance also enter into the analysis of mistaken
belief in the imminence of an attack. A good example is State v.
Wanrow, 42 in which the defendant suspected a man named Wesler of
having molested her son and violated her daughter. When confronted
with these charges, Wesler went to the home of Yvonne Wanrow's
friend. Wesler, "a large man who was visibly intoxicated, entered the
home and when told to leave declined to do so."43 A quarrel ensued.
Wanrow, who was 5'4" and then on crutches, had a pistol in her purse.
Suddenly Wesler appeared behind her. "She testified to being gravely
startled by this situation and to having then shot [and killed] Wesler in
what amounted to a reflex action.""" Yvonne Wanrow was convicted of
second-degree murder."~
The conviction was reversed partly because the trial court had admitted into evidence the tape recording of a telephone call in which
Wanrow's friend made statements that apparently incriminated the defendant by making the shooting appear vengeful rather than defensive.48 For our purposes, the more interesting grounds for reversal are
the defects asserted in the instruction quoted above. 47 The instruction
directs the jury to consider only those circumstances occurring "at or
immediately before the killing." The Supreme Court of Washington
responds: "This is not now, and never has been, the law of self-defense
in Washington. On the contrary, the justification of self-defense is to be
evaluated in light of all the facts and circumstances known to the defendant, including those known substantially before the killing." 48
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977).
Id. at 551.
Id.
Id. at 550.
Id.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
559 P.2d at 555.
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In particular, the court noted, the decedent's reputation for aggressive behavior, so far as it was known to the defendant, should enter
into an assessment of the "degree of force which . . . a reasonable person in the same situation ... seeing what [s]he sees and knowing what
[s]he knows, then would believe to be necessary." 49 Note that the prior
relationship of the parties, including factors leading to the aggressor's
dominating behavior, bear properly only on the reasonable perception
of danger. This is the aspect of self-defense that, as I have argued,
should be considered grounds for excuse rather than justification. If
Yvonne Wanrow was mistaken about the danger that the decedent represented, she could try to invoke the relationship of the parties in assessing whether her mistake was reasonable and therefore compatible
with an excuse.
In an additional, arguably redundant paragraph, the court notes
the concentration of the disputed instruction on the male gender as
though the standard "to be applied is that applicable to an altercation
between two men." 150 This arguably deprived the defendant of the equal
protection of the laws. A correct instruction would enable "the jury
[to] consider her actions in the light of her own perceptions of the situation, including those perceptions which were the product of our nation's long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination." 151
These last lines have spawned a great deal of misunderstanding.
There is no doubt, as I have argued since the early 1970s,152 that excusing conditions should focus on the individual circumstances of the person asserting the excuse. If a female defender is substantially weaker
than her assailant, this factor obviously should enter into the analysis
of whether her perception of danger is reasonable under the circumstances. The problem, in my view, is not the "history of sex discrimination" (however malign that history may have been) but rather the unfortunate history of a system of criminal law that has paid too little
attention to rendering justice in individual cases of excusable criminal
actions.
49. Id. at 557 (quoting State v. Dunning, 506 P.2d 321, 322 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973)).
50. Id. at 558.
51. Id. at 559 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)).
52. See George P. Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL L.
REV. 1269 (1974).

